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 The new demands for the regulation of competitive public services, 
which have changed several parameters of traditional administrative law in a 
framework of redefining the role of the state, require the analysis of 
instruments used in public policies for development. In this context, the 
telecommunications sector seeks to fulfill two main objectives: universal 
access and competition. Subsequently, public tenders of licenses to operate 
4G technology in Brazil have used a number of expedients, such as the 
requirement to waive existing licenses or the cross-subsidization 
incorporated in the joint tendering of frequency bands for rural areas. 
Through an analysis using a descriptive, inductive and interdisciplinary 
method, in which we compare the current situation in this sector with earlier 
national and international experience, we conclude that universal access can 
be achieved by means of the employed instruments, however, under different 
circumstances with respect to competition.  
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Introduction 
 In June 2012, an auction was conducted by the Brazilian National 
Telecommunications Agency (Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações - 
ANATEL) to publically tender the licenses to use radio frequencies in the 
450 MHz and 2.5 GHz sub-bands (the latter are known as 4G technology). 
Such licenses to exploit a public good represent a significant benefit for the 
telecommunications sector because they will facilitate a substantive increase 
in the exchange of data between service users. Therefore, questions have 
been raised regarding the contribution of this license-granting process to 
development, which is understood as changes in the economic and social 
structure (NUSDEO, 2001) and characterized as a process of 
institutionalizing economic democracy (SALOMÃO FILHO, 2002). Given 
the recent increase in demand for communications services by consumers, 
broadband presents an important opportunity to increase related 
infrastructure. The same phenomenon occurred in the USA, according to 
Degnan, McLaren and Tennant. By increasing the demand, the transmission 
area increases, causing gaps between locations. To fill these gaps, providers 
of cellular services should construct additional sites to accommodate the 
increased demand without sacrificing the service quality, which requires an 
efficient regulation that encourages such behavior (1999).  
 According to Salomão Filho, there are three principles of economic 
order that enable society to choose between options: the redistributive 
principle, the principle of dilution of the economic power centers and the 
cooperation principle. The primary goal of the Brazilian government is to 
promote development through the adoption of these principles. Thus, its 
intervention by guidance in the economic field becomes relevant.  
 In this context, ANATEL’s tender of radio frequency bands 
represents a case of regulation with developmental scope in search of the 
forced diffusion of economic knowledge. This diffusion occurs by the 
implementation of the redistributive principle (observed in determining the 
expansion of service to rural areas by the companies that won the auction) 
and the principle of dilution of the economic power centers (realized in 
encouraging competition by dividing the spectrum into sub-bands and lots 
and by the requirement of waiving the 3G spectrum in the same locality by 
the winning companies). These circumstances characterize the 
telecommunications sector, where Law No. 9.472/1997 (the General 
Telecommunications Law – Lei Geral de Telecomunicações - LGT) adopts 
the principles of competition and universal access as the policy foundation 
for the sector. 
 However, certain questions should be raised, such as the technical 
basis used for the adoption of this system, because there may be more viable 
alternatives. For example, could the determination to expand service to rural 
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areas by the same companies that won the auction, that is, dividing the 
spectrum into sub-bands and lots and waiving existing licenses (in certain 
cases, inserted in the public policy for the sector), result in the sector’s 
development, or would this practice discourage investment by forcing 
investors to make expenditures on activities that are not always profitable? 
Furthermore, could the desired results be achieved by such instruments, or 
would a greater liberalization be more practical? These issues, in a broader 
view, are profoundly linked to a vision of how the state should act in the 
economy to foster development. 
 To obtain at least a few answers to these questions and because the 
research objectives concern examining the reasons for the government’s 
arguments and the consequences of the demands placed on companies, the 
most appropriate method is descriptive. This method does not necessarily 
establish the factors that contribute to a phenomenon’s occurrence, 
something that is difficult to determine in the case of social sciences (GIL, 
2007). Based on this descriptive perspective, the inductive method also 
appears relevant. The hypotheses will emerge from the analyses of the 
current legal scenario in Brazil, of the incentives (from a developmental 
perspective) and of other cases that used the same instruments. This 
approach will facilitate a conclusion that can be “reality tested” because it is 
grounded in concrete cases. Therefore, the use of an interdisciplinary 
approach is also necessary (DEMO, 2000, p. 65), including mainly concepts 
from other areas of the exact and economic sciences.  
 Because the methodological and technical possibilities do not exist, 
accurate projections are impossible. We intend simply to establish a number 
of assertions about the public policy to encourage competition and universal 
access that was employed in granting the new licenses. 
  
Current Broadband Scenario in the Brazilian Telecommunications 
Sector 
 Until the implementation of the “Telebrás System” (Brazilian 
Telecommunications - Telecomunicações Brasileiras - Telebrás), the 
Brazilian telecommunications sector consisted of several local and regional 
companies, whose operations lacked coordination. This lack of coordination 
jeopardized the development of a national network, which was essential for 
communication. The system’s effective implementation between the late 
1960s and the early 1970s followed a centralized format with the state 
monopoly of the union, which was approved by Article 21, XI, of the Federal 
Constitution of 1988. Such a format was crucial to the development of a 
national infrastructure, both to coordinate actions throughout the national 
territory (previously characterized by the disorganization of local actors) and 
to increase investment (FARACO, 2010). 
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 However, a new context emerged for redefining the role of the state 
in relation to its duties. Here, the late twentieth-century idea of subsidiary 
operation was revived for application in the early twenty-first century. The 
idea was based on economic neutrality and the reduction of state activities 
(GABARDO, 2009). This new context substantially influenced the rules 
governing economic sectors related to infrastructure and therefore the 
telecommunications sector. The transition from the state monopoly to a 
system of private competition began with Constitutional Amendment No. 
08/1995, which amended Article 21, XI, of the Federal Constitution and 
allowed private companies to participate in the implementation of 
telecommunications services. The main objectives of this constitutional 
reform were in tune with the new context. It was sought to strengthen the 
intervention under the state’s guidance in the economy rather than the state’s 
direct operation.  
 The traditional notion of public service itself has been affected. 
Because they are linked to the relations between state and society existing in 
the historical moment in which they develop, legal institutions reflect such a 
relationship (GROTTI, 2006). Thus, the need to introduce competition in a 
particular previously monopolistic sector, such as telecommunications, 
meant that public services could be provided on a private basis. This 
approach opposes the classical idea of public service in which such a 
provision would only occur in a public regime (GROTTI, 2006). Actually, 
this division of regimes, public and private, is at the center of the two 
principles that guide the regulation of the telecommunications sector: 
competition and universal access. This sector has two peculiarities that 
require the public law applied to it to modify itself to maintain its 
effectiveness: a greater influence of technological advancement and a legal 
subsystem within the system itself. These peculiarities transform the useless 
and antiquated legal tools applied in this economic area (MARQUES NETO, 
2006). Grotti advises that changes to the state model resulted in a new 
principle that would be friendlier to the regulation model of competitive 
public services: the principle of vertical disintegration of the distinct phases 
or segments of a business (unbundling), where the segments provided by 
competing operators in competition would be distinguished in it. Common to 
all, the infrastructure, and another singled out, the service itself.  
 The new system was based on two premises. As previously 
mentioned, the first one would be the cessation of direct guidance by the 
state, which counter-intuitively substantially increased its regulatory role. 
The second would be the legal balance between the two main principles: 
universal access and competition. Universal access would seek to reach 
potential users, whereas competition would seek the effective user. Such a 
balance would be achieved using regulatory asymmetry between providers in 
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the public system, who would be obliged to furnish universal access, and 
providers in the private system, who would not be obliged to do so (other 
than by the possibility of interconnecting networks) (MARQUES NETO, 
2006).  Therefore, basically, universal access would be provided for the 
segment in which there would be no infrastructure or access, thus would 
connecting it to the public service provided in the public regime, and 
competition would be applied to the segment in which it was possible, with 
public service provided in a private regime.  
 After the establishment of this general framework by LGT (before 
concessions were made), the Union initially enacted a General Concession 
Plan (Plano Geral de Outorgas - PGO) through Decree 2.534/98 to establish 
competition in the various regions of the country by creating a duopoly 
system in each one. Universal access included two situations: individual 
telecommunications services that should be provided at reasonable fees to 
any person or organization and other forms of individual access to 
telecommunications services without the economic condition of paying 
commercially reasonable rates for individual services. Thus, Decree 4.733/03 
established that public policies related to telecommunications services should 
ensure individual access for all citizens to at least one telecommunication 
service and the Internet at reasonable rates.  
 After these preliminary considerations, we can establish the basic 
normative framework that regulates the exploitation of this public good and 
according to which the ANATEL auction of radio frequency licenses was 
conducted. This step is relevant because it will demonstrate whether the legal 
stimuli in the sector can actually develop the infrastructure. With only 
several differences regarding nomenclature remaining, the main normative 
reference is the LGT. Without making considerations of constitutional order 
will not be considered because there are no doubts regarding the possibility 
of transferring the service implementation to private agents or the possibility 
of direct implementation by the Union. The LGT determined that the 
exploitation of the radio frequency service would occur according to a 
private regime based on a previous approval from ANATEL (artigo 131, §1o, 
LGT). Within the relevant adopted public policies, the public good must still 
be contained in the National Broadband Plan (Decreto no 7.175/10) and the 
General Plan of Universal Access Goals for the Fixed Switched Telephone 
Service (Decreto nº 7.512/2011). This plan has been decisive for the 
inclusion of the granting of licenses to use of radio frequencies in the 450 
MHz band, which are essential bands for meeting the established goals there.  
 The invitation to tender was prepared with the purpose of 
implementing the provisions contained in the Decreto nº 7.512/2011 and 
approved by Resolution No 516/2008 in compliance with Resolution No 
544/10. 
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Public Policy Requirements for the Sector at the Invitation to Tender 
 Already prior to the issue of the invitation to tender, ANATEL was 
assigned (Decreto no 7.512/2011) the expansion of access to 
telecommunications by granting licenses to use the radio frequency sub-
bands from 451 MHz to 458 MHz and from 461 MHz to 468 MHz and to 
require from the grantees counterparts in the form of services to rural and 
remote regions. Two principals were to be observed: (i) the gradual 
expansion of the service penetration in rural areas and remote regions 
through selection criteria based on the lowest price of service plans for the 
final consumer and (ii) the principle of providing free broadband Internet 
access in all public schools in rural areas.  
 Based on the Decree, ANATEL issued the Resolution No 544/2010 to 
modify the allotment and regulate the use of radio frequencies in the 
currently used bands, as well as those that would be tendered, where the joint 
tendering for use of the 450 MHz band along with the 2.5 GHz band arouse. 
This joint tender actually reverberates an old expedient in the 
telecommunications sector known as cross-subsidy, which is the transfer of 
funds from a one particular segment to another so that the beneficiary 
segment can pay lower values rates (CÂMARA, 2009).  
 Because the radio frequency spectrum is a public good of limited 
resources managed by ANATEL, it fell to ANATEL, within its reasonable 
discretionary judgment, to decide in a motivated way to jointly tender 
licenses for the use of the 450 MHz and 2.5 GHz bands. ANATEL’s 
technical department demonstrated that the proposed tendering model would 
ensure the viability of operations in both bands. Thus, within the presented 
normative framework, there is no legal impediment to the proposal of a joint 
tender of the 2.5 GHz and 450 MHz bands. Furthermore, in the case of a 
joint tendering, the imposition of obligations on the part of the winning 
bidder is possible. Such a system has been adopted by ANATEL for some 
time and can be seamlessly implemented with the assumption by the winner 
of commitments in favor of the community, for example, the implementation 
of support to provide services in rural areas. Commitments are made based 
on LGT articles 135 and 136, paragraph 3, among other articles. In this 
regard, Decree 7.512/2011 determines, regarding the 450 MHz band, that the 
tender requires counterparts from the winners in the attendance form of rural 
areas and remote regions.  
 Another requirement is found in article 11 of Resolution No. 
544/2010, which establishes guidelines for the licenses to use radio 
frequencies acquired in new tendering processes: certain “spectrum” limits 
should be respected. That is, it was clearly established that to use 4G 
technology, providers should renounce the use of existing licenses in the 
same locations, in this case, to use 3G technology. Thus, by limiting the 
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auction participants, ANATEL promoted competition by encouraging the 
diverse entry of new providers in the 2.5 GHz band in specific market 
niches. This restriction is intended to prevent the domination of this scarce 
public good (the radio frequency spectrum) by one or a few companies and 
to stimulate competitiveness in the sector.  
 Finally, Invitation to Tender No. 004/2012/PVCP/SPV was 
published. In addition to establishing the obligation to waive the use of 
existing licenses, limits were re-defined in the Invitation to Tender in items. 
Accordingly, the division of the tendered object into radio frequency sub-
bands, which were grouped into lots for auction and of the invitation to 
tender could be verified. Both measures are aimed at enhancing competition.  
 
Previous National Experience in the Search for Universal Access to 3G 
Technology and Several Points Regarding Competition And Some 
International Experiences 
 Mobile networks for broadband access using 3G technology were 
implemented beginning in 2007 with two operators on the 850 MHz band. 
Similar to the tender of 4G technology, which aimed to expand the provision 
of services based on this technology, Invitation to Tender No. 002/2007/SPV 
sought to guarantee PMS coverage in all Brazilian municipalities by 2010 
and the diffusion of 3G technologies throughout the country by requiring 
various obligations to be assumed by the concessionaires who purchased the 
sub-bands such as including a requirement in the invitation to tender related 
to the injunction to provide service to areas of high interest and to less 
attractive areas, as described for the 4G technology auction. The result was 
progress in the expansion of 3G technology for PMS use throughout the 
country, although the service has not yet reached several less populated 
regions (PENA; ABDALLA JÚNIOR; PEREIRA FILHO, 2012). However, 
at the time the initial fixed network system for FSTS and CMS (the mobile 
service that preceded PMS) was implemented, the adopted mechanisms had 
perhaps failed to apportion competition. It seems that there was no 
consolidation of other companies to compete with the companies purchasing 
the entire previously installed public network. However, there was a 
substantial increase in competition regarding the mobile telephony market in 
which these concessionaires disputed the market with groups formed from 
the duopoly established for CMS, which resulted in a rapid service expansion 
(FARACO, 2010).  
 The description of some international experiences in the sector, 
which used the same public policy mechanisms adopted in Brazil, has a 
substantial value to be used, if not as a parameter, as data intended for 
developing assertions about its effectiveness. In an article on the diffusion of 
mobile telecommunications in Central and Eastern Europe, Gruber states that 
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for many decades, the telecommunications market was based on a natural 
monopoly (as in Brazil). This natural monopoly became untenable with the 
development of mobile technology, particularly with the change from an 
analog to a digital system. This change substantially increased the efficient 
use of the frequency spectrum, which expanded the market and enabled the 
participation of a larger number of competing companies. As a result, the 
spread of the service accelerated (GRUBER, 2000).  
 Regarding cross-subsidies in telecommunications, Kaserman, Mayo 
and Flynn state emphatically that such subsidies are useless for development. 
Based on an analysis of empirical results, they demonstrate that such policy 
has no causal relationship with the goal of universal access and observe that 
subsidies and subscription fees are determined by economic variables such as 
those described in the theories of competitive market regulation (1990). 
Conversely, Majumdar and Chang conclude that in the U.S. the funds 
generated by cross-subsidies were invested by companies in technology 
diffusion and digital technology development. The subsidies played a 
positive role in providing the capital that these companies required to expand 
consumer access (2013). Interestingly, if cross-subsidies are used in a free 
market only for certain companies while others are prohibited from using 
them, coercive regulatory intervention is required to prevent the market from 
destabilizing and damaging competition (FAULHABER, 1975).  
  
The requirements of the Invitation to Tender and the Development issue 
 The development issue is highly interesting to legal scholars but 
causes uncertainty because it is important and requires definition. Here, 
efforts will be made to use the views of a limited number of development 
researchers, which may contribute to disentangling the central issues: (i) Can 
universal access and competition with respect to 4G mobile technology and 
wireless networks generate development? (ii) Could the public policy 
requirements for the sector regarding the invitation to tender generate 
universal access and competition, or would other methods be more efficient?  
 However, it is first relevant to note that communication services are 
highly important in economic development. Using economies of scale and 
exhibiting network effects, such services generate benefits that encourage 
innovation in other sectors in a spillover effect. In this context, broadband 
has become the most robust platform for facilitating economic development, 
stimulating innovation in other sectors (DAVIDSON; SANTORELLI, 2010). 
Regarding the first question, it is important to examine the relationship 
between the constitution and development. The Federal Constitution and 
development connote the emancipation of humanity, whereby the Federal 
Constitution is related to the restriction of arbitrary political power and 
development addresses the satisfaction of material and spiritual needs 
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(VIEIRA, 2012). This statement does not address the criticism of certain 
scholars who have discussed the need to reduce expectations regarding the 
influence of the law as a component of development, given the complexity of 
the legal system (BARRAL, 2006).  
 Development has acquired legal force in Brazil by being elevated to 
the status of a fundamental goal of the republic, according to Article 3, 
Section II of the Federal Constitution. This section should be read in 
conjunction with the other sections of Article 3 because the idea of 
development should involve not only a guarantee but also development’s 
promotion by the Brazilian state. Accordingly and based on an analysis of 
the beginning of Article 170, we could state that national development is to 
be achieved through Brazil’s economic order, which is founded on the 
appreciation of human labor and free enterprise. These factors should 
support the Brazilian state (artigo 1o, IV) with the ultimate goal of ensuring a 
dignified existence for all. This goal is primarily associated with the social 
rights described in Article 6 of the Federal Constitution. The same would 
occur relative to the purpose of the economic order stipulated in the 
beginning of Article 170 of the Federal Constitution and with respect to 
public services, where the state has the duty to act as a regulator (artigo 174 
da Constituição Federal) or to provide public services (artigo 175 da 
Constituição Federal). We could say that such services are related to 
activities connected with sustainable national development because the 
effectiveness of such development is closely linked to the social rights 
guaranteed in Article 6, particularly the infrastructure required for 
development’s realization (SHIRATO, 2005).  
 In a subjective sense, the idea of development should consider the 
agents responsible for development or development’s beneficiaries because 
development is linked to fundamental human rights (RISTER, 2007). Well, 
under this regard, what would be the purpose of the obligation to provide 
universal access to the telecommunications services if not development 
because it would create greater access? And the prediction that larger actors 
will work in the sector through competition?  
 From this subjective perspective, there is also the developmental 
theory of Sen. Generally, according to this author, development should be 
observed as a process of expanding the real freedoms of the people, which 
would allow for their free status as agents, and this requires the removal of 
the major sources of their deprivation. The ideal instrument for achieving 
each freedom is public policy (2000). Not much effort is required to verify 
that the joint tendering of the 450 MHz and 2.5 GHz bands, which seeks to 
increase service penetration in rural and remote areas (and thus remove the 
obstacle of the lacking commercial interest of these areas), aims to expand 
the economic facility and social opportunity of the individuals who live 
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there. Increasing competition by dividing the tendering object into radio 
frequency sub-bands would remove barriers to the entry of new companies 
into the market and contribute to economic facilities, although from an 
entrepreneurial perspective. In the U.S., competition has been promoted as 
the proper means to organize the telecommunications sector, while reflecting 
the new technological realities and opportunities (TEECE, 1999).  
 From an economic perspective, these public policy instruments in the 
search for universal access and competition aim to correct the so-called 
“market failures”, each in one aspect. In essence, these failures would be 
ubiquitous externalities, public goods, imperfect competition and inadequate 
information (MITCHELL; SIMMONS, 2003), which would create inequities 
in the distribution of wealth, creating inequality. A plausible response to this 
phenomenon would be public policy. A well-designed state action in this 
regard would directly benefit the end users of the service 
(telecommunications consumers) because it would create genuine 
competition and not additional different prices based on market distortions 
and produced by random “patchwork” (MARASHLIAN; HANKINS; 
MCREYNOLDS, 2011). However, several criticisms can be made. For 
example, neoliberal theorists argue that prices coordinate human activity, 
and incidentally, the market coordinates better than politics. The markets 
would be decentralized processes that guide human activity (MITCHELL; 
SIMMONS, 2003). Because they are inefficient, policy instruments, such as 
those used in the telecommunications sector, would simply distort the normal 
course of activity.  
 From the economic perspective, generally, Furtado begins by 
observing that development is commonly defined as the increase in the 
quantity of goods and services during a particular period for a particular 
community and that quantitative elements are linked to the price system. For 
Furtado, development must be linked to the increased flow of social income, 
whose growth is only possible with the increase in productive capacity. In 
the case of an industrial society, such as present-day society, the 
accumulation of surplus is in the hands of the businesspeople who 
reincorporate it into the production process through new techniques, which 
generates internal market expansion without the need to search for new 
markets (FURTADO, 2009). Thus, would it not be appropriate to ask 
whether the expansion of the 4G service to new users through new 
techniques could not generate increased domestic market and entrepreneurial 
gains, which would increase productivity and therefore development?  
 In another perspective, Salomão Filho states that we cannot use a 
purely economic idea of development because such an idea is only based on 
efficient outcomes and does not indicate the direction in which the process 
must occur. This role should be assigned to the law, whose function is 
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essentially linked to the fundamental values of social organization. Based on 
this idea, Salomão Filho elects three guiding principles of the development 
effort, which would enable society to choose between the options listed in 
the principles of economic order inscribed under Article 170 of the Federal 
Constitution. The first principle would be the redistributive principle (artigo 
170, VII, Constituição Federal), which would expand the consumption by 
society, resulting in the inclusion in the economical choice process and the 
elimination of allocative efficiencies in economic knowledge concentration 
because the database on individual preferences would be enlarged. The 
second principle would be the principle of the dilution of economic power 
centers (artigo 170, incisos IV e V, da Constituição Federal). According to 
this principle, competition should be a fundamental guaranteed value 
because competition increases freedom of choice and consumer information. 
Additionally, there should be greater involvement of social groups in the 
process of drafting regulations. Finally, there is the principle of cooperation 
(artigo 170, incisos IV e V, da Constituição Federal). This principle’s goal 
would be the reduction of strictly individualistic choices at the expense of 
social choices, whereby the lack of cooperation should be viewed as an 
informational problem that is not linked to human nature. (SALOMÃO 
FILHO, 2002). 
 Starting from this concept, we clearly envision the developmental 
scope of the licensing of radio frequency spectra for 4G technology in the 
pursuit of the forced diffusion of economic knowledge through the 
implementation of (i) the redistributive principle, which can be achieved by 
assigning the expansion of 4G service in rural areas to the companies that 
win the auction, and (ii) the principle of the dilution of economic power 
centers, which can be realized by increasing competition. Both principles can 
be observed in the division of the spectrum into sub-bands and lots and in the 
mandatory waiver of the 3G spectrum by winning companies in the same 
geographical region. Therefore, after addressing several answers regarding to 
the question of whether universal access and competition of 4G mobile 
technology used to providing access through wireless networks would be 
able to generate development, we concluded, not definitively, that yes, they 
would be able either by seeking to enforce the constitutional principles and 
social rights or by allowing the individuals to develop their skills by 
themselves, either by generating expansion of the internal market, or by 
seeking the forced diffusion of economic knowledge. In this context, the 
effectiveness of public services, which are mandatory for development, is 
necessarily linked to the regulatory activity of the state, which organizes 
economic activity by intervening through the granting of public services to 
private persons and regulating their use or by exercising police power by 
enacting rules and supervising (SALOMÃO FILHO, 2008).  
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 Thus, we attempt to answer the second question (stated earlier): 
Could public policy requirements for the sector (with respect to the invitation 
to tender) based on government regulation in the pursuit of development 
generate universal access and competition?  
 For universal access, the expansion of the GSM network is required. 
As demonstrated by a survey conducted by Pena, Abdalla Junior and Pereira 
Filho (2012), through the 3G technology invitation to tender, which 
accomplished the same goal of universal access established in the 4G 
technology invitation to tender (joint tendering involving rural areas), there 
has been progress in the expansion of 3G technology for PMS across the 
country. Nevertheless, the service has not yet reached several less populated 
regions. Evidence of service expansion with compulsory universal access in 
the diffusion of mobile telecommunications can also be found in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 No evidence of effectiveness was found regarding the promotion of 
competition through mandatory waiving of existing licenses and the division 
of the radio frequencies into a larger number of sub-bands. Most likely, these 
mechanisms did not achieve their goals because the winning companies were 
Claro, Vivo, Tim and Oi, which dominate the market. However, as 
previously described, after the regulation of the sector, there was an increase 
in mobile telephony competition because the concessionaires disputed the 
market with groups formed from the duopoly established for CMS, which 
quickly expanded the service. Thus, we have found strong evidence that the 
public policy requirements for the sector (expressed in the invitation to 
tender) in the pursuit of development can generate universal access to the 
service. Regarding competition, we could not establish a stronger proposition 
because the only evidence of effectiveness occurred at the time of tendering, 
not during the development of the market.  
  
Conclusion 
 The current normative framework for broadband is inserted in a legal 
system for the telecommunications sector created to stimulate competition 
and universal access in the face of new demands for the regulation of 
competitive public services. These demands changed several parameters of 
traditional public services in a context of redefining the role of the state in 
the 1990s and require that instruments are adopted through public policies 
that aim at such stimuli. 
 Both pillars of the legal system are connected to a broader vision of 
how the state should act in the economy to foster development. It was 
concluded that universal access and competition with respect to the 4G 
mobile technology used to provide access through wireless networks would 
be able to generate development. as they would realize constitutional 
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principles and social rights would be recognized, which would enable 
individuals to develop their capabilities, expand the domestic market and 
promote the forced diffusion of economic knowledge. Based on these 
requirements and several decrees and resolutions supported by LGT and the 
Federal Constitution, ANATEL issued the Invitation to Tender No. 
004/2012/PVCP/SPV with three public policy instruments. Two instruments 
aimed to increase competition: the obligation to waive existing licenses by 
the winning companies in the same territory and the division of the tendered 
radio frequencies into sub-bands. The sub-bands were grouped into lots for 
auction. One aim was universal access through cross-subsidization, which 
was incorporated into the joint tendering of the 450 MHz and 2.5 GHz 
bands. The first was designated for rural areas.  
 Regarding the latter, expanding the use of CMS by expanding its 
GSM network would provide universal access. This goal could be achieved 
because of experience with the previous technology (3G) on the national 
level, international experience with the forced realization of the principle and 
the use of cross-subsidization. This achievement demonstrates the 
effectiveness of this public policy instrument. The same cannot be stated 
regarding the increase in competition. The tender winners were Claro, Vivo, 
Tim and Oi. These companies largely dominate the market. These companies 
are rapidly expanding service. However, there is no consistent evidence that 
their competition benefits the consumer while properly developing the 
market, perhaps because the process remains at an early stage. 
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